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Abstract 
As one of the most popular and influential legal ideologies since its inception in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, there is a vast wealth of law and economics scholarship with 
remarkable breadth encompassing nearly every area of law. Yet despite the abundance of 
scholarship examining legal issues through a law and economics lens, there is 
comparatively little literature explaining law and economics itself. This paper seeks to 
overcome this gap in the literature by more clearly explaining the economic concepts on 
which the theory is built and the connections between these concepts. In other words, this 
paper aims to provide a clear, cohesive and complete overview of law and economics 
such that readers will be able to understand how these economic concepts relate to each 
other and the study of law.
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1.1. Introduction 
As one of the most popular and influential legal ideologies since its inception in the late 
1950s and early 1960s,  there is a vast wealth of law and economics scholarship with 1
remarkable breadth encompassing nearly every area of law.  Yet despite the abundance of 2
scholarship examining legal issues through a law and economics lens, there is 
comparatively little literature explaining law and economics itself. At present, most of 
this expository literature is encapsulated in a handful of popular introductory texts aimed 
at law students and undergraduate economics students.  On the whole, this work tends to 3
be more practice-oriented than theoretical in that little space is devoted to explaining the 
theory with the bulk of the analysis instead being devoted to the application of economic 
principles in legal cases. These introductions focus on how to conduct an economic 
analysis of cases while largely skimming over theoretical components.
This paper seeks to overcome this gap in the literature by more clearly explaining 
the economic concepts on which the theory is built and the connections between these 
concepts. Drawing upon the scholarship explaining law and economics, this paper 
 See e.g. William M Landes, “The Empirical Side of Law & Economics”(2003) 70:1 U Chicago 1
L Rev 167 at 167 (“economic analysis of law is widely considered the most important 
development in legal thought in the last fifty years”). See also Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, 
Law and Economics, 6th ed (Boston: Addison-Welsley/Prentice Hall, 2012) at 2 stating that law 
and economics has been viewed as “the most important development in legal scholarship of the 
twentieth century”. For a Canadian context, see Michael Trebilcock, “The Prospects of ‘Law and 
Economics’: A Canadian Perspective” (1983) 33:2 J Leg Ed 288.
 See e.g. Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 9th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law 2
& Business, 2014) at 4 and Richard A Posner, “The Law and Economics Movement” (1987) 77:2 
The American Economic Review 1 at 1.
 Many of these books explicitly acknowledge that students are their target audience. See e.g. 3
Daniel H Cole & Peter Z Grossman, Principles of Law and Economics, 2nd ed (New York: 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011) at xix and David D Friedman, Law’s Order: What 
Economics Has To Do With Law and Why It Matters (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000) at 5-6.
2
synthesizes the existing literature into a coherent theoretical account of law and 
economics. In this sense, it will build upon the prior scholarship’s discussions of key 
economic concepts and seminal writings in order to provide a summary of the theory. The 
goal is to create a more integrated approach blending the varying strands throughout 
current explanations into a new unified whole. In other words, this paper aims to provide 
a clear, cohesive and complete overview of law and economics. The goal is that readers 
will be able to understand how these economic concepts relate to each other and the study 
of law.
1.2. How Law and Economics Is Explained 
Typically, the existing literature explaining law and economics begins with an 
introductory chapter or two summarizing microeconomics. Unfortunately, these 
economic concepts are often presented and discussed entirely in the abstract with no 
readily apparent relevance to law. Hence, the literature reads as if it were an introductory 
microeconomics text rather than a legal theory. Although these scholars discuss how 
economics applies to law, they typically do so in later sections divorced from their 
summaries of microeconomics.  This isolated approach to explaining economics is 4
problematic for law and economics both on persuasive and theoretical levels. By not 
clearly explaining economics’ relevance to law from the outset, the scholarship is 
inadvertently giving skeptical readers license to dismiss the theory as irrelevant and 
uninteresting. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many lawyers and law students 
come from humanities or arts focused backgrounds so that the very mathematical and 
 See e.g. Ulen & Cooter, supra note 1 at 11-51 and Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G Medema, 4
Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond, 2nd ed (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006) at 20-25.
3
technical nature of microeconomics can be especially off-putting.  Consequently, it is 5
preferable to build on the approach taken by some law and economics scholars who 
interject their discussion of economic theory with specific legal examples  as this would 6
help maintain reader interest amongst the legal profession while simultaneously 
bolstering the theory. On a theoretical level, law and economics needs to be able to 
cogently explain economics’ relevancy to law in order to ensure that economics is an 
appropriate evaluative criteria for legal rules. Without this clear explanation, the whole 
project of law and economics is questionable. Going forward, it would be best if 
economics was clearly tied to its legal applications from the beginning.
Similarly, although the existing literature rightly identifies foundational texts and 
core ideas within law and economics, regrettably these are often treated as unconnected 
standalone concepts. Typically, these ideas are presented as a seemingly disparate list 
without explicitly explaining how they are related and connected to each other.  7
Consequently, concepts such as the Coase Theorem, risk aversion and rational choice 
theory are often listed without demonstrating how they are tied together. While the 
description of each individual idea may be clear, this atomized approach again hurts the 
theory on both persuasive and theoretical levels. On a persuasive level, this tendency in 
the scholarship may mean that economic concepts inadvertently come across as unrelated 
 In keeping with some prominent law and economics texts, this paper will not rely on 5
mathematics in the interest of furthering accessibility and comprehension. See e.g. Mitchell A 
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 4th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business, 2011).
 See e.g. Alan James Devlin, Fundamental Principles of Law and Economics (Abingdon, Oxon: 6
Rutledge, 2015) at 20-23 (illustrating how criminal law may be viewed as an application of 
microeconomics after introducing these concepts).
 See e.g. ibid at ch 2.7
4
to each other. Thus, law and economics might appear unattractive because it seemingly 
lacks cohesion. Likewise, on a theoretical level, this unconnected approach may give the 
mistaken impression that law and economics is not theoretically sound because it appears 
as a loose collection of ideas rather than stemming from first principles. This paper hopes 
to overcome any possible misconceptions in earlier scholarship by being explicit about 
the connections within law and economics. In particular, it aims to establish how rational 
choice theory is the critical assumption underlying an economic analysis. 
This functional approach dominating current explanations of law and economics 
leads to many examples of an economic analysis in a variety of areas. The scholars tend 
to provide a series of papers which show how an economic approach may be used in a 
wide array of different areas of law including property, contract, tort, crime, family and 
antitrust.  Within each paper, scholars usually look at specific legal doctrines such as 8
negligence or limited liability and show either how they reflect fundamental economic 
concepts described earlier or how these concepts could be used to properly interpret the 
doctrine. In this sense, the scholarship promotes the feeling of a loose science in which 
readers will be able to grasp economic thinking and its application to the law without 
necessarily understanding the principles underlying this ideological approach. The goal of 
these texts is to leave readers with the same useable method to employ in all sorts of 
different legal scenarios.
Although having many practical examples is helpful to understanding law and 
economics, the explanation of the application of economic concepts to law within these 
examples is sometimes vague and unclear. For example, some of the more popular law 
 See generally e.g. Posner, supra note 2.8
5
and economics texts are written in a more conversational style in which they go back and 
forth between different economic concepts interchangeably.  While this approach makes 9
law and economics more accessible, it can lead to a looseness with the material. The 
literature often aims for readers to “get the gist of it” and proceed with a basic 
understanding rather than a full-fledged account from philosophical first principles. At 
other points, the texts may ask the reader to determine on his or her own how the 
economic approach is being used and why without ever providing an explicit answer.  10
Admittedly, this is a common approach to writing texts for law students generally, not 
restricted to law and economics. However, in part, this also reflects a tendency to treat 
law and economics as self-evident. In these circumstances, the law and economics 
understanding is somewhat guesswork by the reader based on the ability to piece together 
earlier parts of the literature. 
In general, the literature does not explicitly acknowledge the assumptions 
underlying the field.  For the most part, it proceeds by discussing economic ideas in 
which their significance is taken as a given, unstated or implicit. Little space is devoted to 
a normative justification of law and economics, opting instead to proceed with a largely 
unstated assumed position that the theory is beneficial and worthwhile. Although some 
scholarship has identified the philosophical premises underpinning the theory, this usually 
only occurs in the criticism on law and economics which seeks to reject it.  The majority 11
 See generally ibid.9
 See generally ibid.10
 For a strong discussion of philosophical assumptions taking a critical approach to law and 11
economics see Jules L Coleman,  “Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations 
of the Economic Approach” (1984) 94:4 Ethics 649. Occasionally some proponents of law and 
economics explicitly discuss these assumptions. See e.g. Robert D Cooter, “The Best Right Laws: 
Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law” (1989) 64 Notre Dame L Rev 817.
6
of law and economics literature does not concern itself with philosophical defences but 
rather wants to jump ahead to the real world application of law and economics in real 
cases. In fairness, this paper acknowledges that the practical reality that these texts can 
only devote so much space to any given topic particularly when the aim is to provide a 
broad overview. Still, this paper asserts that more pages should be devoted to these 
normative questions because they are crucial to readers’ adoption of law and economics.
1.3. A Better Explanation of Law and Economics 
This paper argues that the existing explanation of law and economics, while 
commendable for its strong real world application, should be revamped for persuasive 
and theoretical reasons. By providing a clearer and more complete account of law and 
economics, more people will adopt an economic analysis as their preferred method of 
legal perspective. More fundamentally, in the process of reviewing limitations in how law 
and economics is currently explained, the understanding of law and economics will be 
substantiated. Thus, this paper proceeds with both practical and theoretical objectives. It 
hopes to persuade others that law and economics is a worthwhile approach while 
simultaneously strengthening law and economics itself.
The paper outlines law and economics as a legal theory which utilizes economics 
to understand legal issues and cases. Under law and economics, law becomes the domain 
of the economist rather than the lawyer as legal problems are recast as economic 
problems to be understood and resolved through economic reasoning. Consequently, the 
paper more clearly explains the two implicit halves of economics under law and 
economics then is currently described in the existing literature. First, the paper overcomes 
the descriptive gap in the literature by synthesizing rational choice theory which is the 
7
bedrock principle of law and economics. The critical assumption underlying economics is 
that people behave according to a rational choice model, meaning they aim to best satisfy 
their preferences given their constraints. Second, the paper discusses the other meaning of 
economics, the study of the allocation of scarce resources amongst competing uses in 
society. Economics describes the theoretical construct of perfectly competitive markets in 
which scarce resources are allocated to firms who then produce goods and services to 
meet consumer demand. 
Building upon rational choice theory and the market, these concepts extended as 
the guiding framework for law as legal decisions are either analogized or considered 
identical to market decisions. The paper then describes how the market is used to 
understand law from both a top-down perspective focused on how lawmakers and the 
legal system apply legal rules and a ground-up perspective focused on how citizens 
choose to comply with or violate law. Law resolves conflicts over scarce resources by 
“mimicking the market”. In other words, law facilitates the use of competitive markets by 
lowering transaction costs which would otherwise prevent people from making mutually 
beneficial bargains. Law and economics therefore reimagines legal rules as setting the 
rights and entitlements which determine a series of conflicts regarding the allocation of 
scarce resources.  Law is about restoring the economic and personal freedom that would 12
have occurred if the conditions of perfect competition were met in actuality.
Finally, the paper concludes by explaining how law and economics accordingly 
evaluates legal rules under the economic principle of efficiency as a proxy for how well 
the market is functioning. While there are different definitions of efficiency, this paper 
 Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 12
One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089 at 1090.
8
adopts the Chicago school, or mainstream approach, of law and economics,  which holds 13
that individuals are rational self-maximizers of their own preferences and that the law 
both has been and ought to be interpreted with the principle of wealth maximization.  In 
simple terms, legal rules which maximize wealth across society are desirable and those 
which reduce wealth are rejected. This approach requires judges to make decisions based 
on the aggregate social benefits minus the aggregate social costs to arrive at the greatest 
net benefit. Ideally, legal decisions will be made such that marginal social benefit equals 
marginal social cost meaning that no additional change could be made that would 
increase social welfare. These principles that legal rules both are and should be wealth 
maximizing are known respectively as the positive and normative claims in law and 
economics. 
1.4. Limitations 
At the same time, this paper is subject to certain restrictions which must be 
acknowledged and addressed. Although it aims to provide a summary of the theory of law 
and economics, there will necessarily be limitations in the extent to which certain aspects 
of the theory may be explored.  Law and economics is such a rich and sophisticated field 14
that it is too complex to fully describe within the scope of a single paper. To the extent 
 While there are numerous schools of law and economics, the Chicago school is recognized as  13
“mainstream law and economics”. See Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 94 and Thomas J 
Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law, 2nd ed (Stanford: Stanford Economics and Finance, 
2009) at xxii. Similarly, most of the major texts in law and economics synthesized in this paper 
are written from the Chicago school perspective. See Mercuro & Medema supra note 4 at 94. For 
more on alternative schools in law and economics, see ibid and Ejan Mackaay, “0500 Schools: 
General” in Gerrit de Geet, ed, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd ed (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishers, 2000).
 For example, detailed breakdowns of supply and demand matter for competition law which is 14
not discussed. 
9
that the paper is unable to fully discuss these areas, it refers readers to earlier scholarship 
such as a history of law and economics,  further detail on alternative schools of law and 15
economics  and the encyclopedias of law and economics  for a fuller account.16 17
Admittedly, some may find the focus on the descriptive rather than normative 
elements of law and economics strange. As a controversial theory often caricatured as 
politically conservative, law and economics has long generated significant hostility and 
skepticism among academics.  However, some may think it is preferable to justify a 18
theory before explaining it, this approach does not work for law and economics. The 
normative justification underlying law and economics cannot be understood without first 
grasping how law and economics operates as a descriptive theory. This is because the 
normative branch of law and economics derives exclusively from its positive branch.  19
The positive branch of law and economics holds that existing law is efficient, meaning 
that it seeks to minimize social costs in order to maximize net social benefit. Scholars 
then expanded on this positive claim, known as the efficiency of the common law 
 See e.g. Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 15
Press, 1995) and Heath D Pearson, Origins of Law and Economics: The Economists’ New Science 
of Law, 1830-1930 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4.16
 Francesco Parisi, ed, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics, (Oxford: Oxford 17
University Press, 2017) and Peter Newman, ed, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and 
the Law, (London: Macmillan Reference, 1998).
 Main criticisms include that law and economics relies on an unrealistic and inaccurate view of 18
rationality, that favouring efficiency over distribution skews an already unjust distribution, and 
that the satisfaction of preferences is an inappropriate evaluative standard for law. 
 See similarly Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 129-30 discussing how differences between 19
the Chicago school’s positive and normative claims may be subtle. 
10
hypothesis, to argue that the law should be construed with efficiency as its central goal.  20
In other words, the normative claim stems from the positive branch because it largely 
replicates and supports the same efficiency based view of law. 
Consequently, the paper accepts the normative justifications for law and 
economics  and proceeds from these assumptions in order to better focus on the unifying 21
strands connecting the theory as a whole. In particular, it accepts that under law and 
economics that an unabashed defence of free markets is the best avenue for increasing 
human welfare.  Moreover, this paper accepts that the forward looking ex ante emphasis 22
of law and economics is particularly useful. As an empirical method rooted in rational 
choice theory, law and economics provides an accurate predictive description of how 
people respond to law in reality. It is a valuable theory because it identifies the incentives 
created by law, thus guiding the formation of legal rules.
2.1. Economics in Law and Economics 
 Jon Hanson, Kathleen Hanson & Melissa Hart, “Law and Economics” in Dennis M Patterson 20
ed., A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2nd ed (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) at 300.
 Admittedly, these normative justifications are sometimes scant as economists are often 21
“indifferent, even condescending” towards philosophical questions. See Cooter, supra note 11 at 
817. 
 This approach is justified with a pragmatic approach based in the strong empirical evidence 22
signifying that markets increase human welfare. See generally Richard A Posner, Overcoming 
Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
11
Law and economics is the application of economics, primarily microeconomics or price 
theory, to understand and analyze legal rules and institutions.  Although this definition is 23
circular, it reveals an important truth: the essence of law and economics is the use of an 
outside academic discipline, economics, to gain further insight into the law.  Simply put, 24
law and economics is a legal theory which utilizes economics to understand legal cases 
and issues. As Friedman explains, law and economics “asserts that in order for legal 
academics to fully understand what they are doing, they must first learn economics”.  25
Under law and economics, the economist shows the lawyer how to properly analyze law. 
This is because law and economics is an extension of economics in which economic ideas 
 See similarly “‘Law and Economics’ can be defined as the application of economic theory—23
primarily microeconomics and the basic concepts of welfare to examine the formation, structure, 
processes, and economic impact of law and legal institutions” Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 
at 1, Francesco Parisi, “Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and 
Economics” (2004) 18 European Journal of Law and Economics 259 at 259 and Lewis 
Kornhauser, "The Economic Analysis of Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2017 Edition), Edward N Zalta ed, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/legal-
econanalysis/>.
 The use of another discipline is not unique to law and economics as this is common in any legal 24
theory influenced by legal realism including Marxist and feminist legal theory. See Mercuro & 
Medema, supra note 4 at 19. See similarly, Richard A Posner, “The Decline of Law as an 
Autonomous Discipline” (1987) 100:4 Harv L Rev 761. However, while law and economics is 
often regarded as an offshoot of legal realism this is an overly simplistic view. Unlike legal 
realism which held that all social sciences may further legal analysis, law and economics holds 
economics as the sole social science to be applied to the study of law. Thus, the elevation and 
focus on economics exclusively is a distinguishing characteristic of law and economics. See 
generally Duxbury, supra note 15. 
 Friedman, supra note 3 at 12. See similarly Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at xix (“[t]o 25
understand the law, and how the legal system works, students must have a basic understanding of 
economic principles”). Friedman further speculates that the theory’s insistence that economics is 
essential to the understanding of law has contributed to some legal academics’ hostility towards 
law and economics. See supra note 3 at 12. 
12
and concepts explain the formation and shape the interpretation of legal rules.  26
Consequently, law and economics involves “learning to think like an economist”  27
because it uses economic rather than “legal” reasoning to solve legal problems.  Thus, 28
law and economics should be understood as economics applied to law rather than law 
applied to economics.   In particular, law and economics relies on neoclassical 29
microeconomics and welfare economics “where the operative organizing concepts are 
Pareto efficiency in exchange, Pareto efficiency in production and Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency (i.e., wealth maximization)”.  These terms will be explored more fully 30
throughout this paper.
 While economics is often wrongly narrowly conceived as the study of money and 
markets, in actuality it is a much broader discipline. The most commonly accepted 
definition holds that “[e]conomics is the science which studies human behaviour as a 
 It is for this reason that virtually all early law and economics scholarship and a majority of the 26
most influential law and economics scholars were economists and not lawyers by trade. See Ejan 
Mackaay, “0200 History of Law and Economics” in Gerrit de Geet, ed, Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, 2nd ed (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2000) at 75 (noting that only a 
few early law and economics scholars were lawyers). 
 See e.g. Polinsky, supra note 5 at xv.27
 Although to some extent, law and economics suggests that there is no difference between legal 28
and economic reasoning because the theory maintains that legal reasoning is intuitively 
economic. 
 Some scholars draw a distinction between the terms “law and economics” and “economic 29
analysis of law”. See e.g. Geoffrey P Miller, “Law and Economics Versus Economic Analysis of 
Law” (2011) 11-16  NYU Law and Economics Research Paper. However, the majority use both 
terms interchangeably most notably in Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law. 
 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 20. Although microeconomics is a subset of economics, 30
the two terms will be used interchangeably throughout the paper as they are in the existing 
literature.
13
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”.  Although this 31
definition is somewhat complex, it captures the essential premises of economics. 
Economics is concerned with the problem of the necessity of choice under scarcity. Since 
resources are scarce and have competing uses, there must be some way to allocate them. 
Economics studies how people behave under the conditions of scarcity by assuming  that 
people act according to a rational choice model in which they try to maximize their 
expected benefits subject to their expected costs. Hence law and economics may be 
thought of as the implications of rational choice theory in a world in which resources are 
scare in relation to human wants.  Although law and economics maintains that 32
economics is the key discipline to understanding law, law and economics itself is 
recognized as a distinct field from economics.33
2.2. Rational Choice Theory: The Heart of Law and 
Economics 
It is no understatement to say that law and economics is premised entirely on rational 
choice theory. Law and economics can be considered “a systematic understanding of law 
 Baron Lionel C Robbins, An Essay On The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 3rd 31
ed (New York: New York University Press, 1984) at 15. Although there is no universally accepted 
definition of economics, since most accept the definition offered by Robbins, it will likewise be 
adopted in this paper. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 1, Ulen & Cooter, supra note 1 at 
11-2 and Devlin, supra note 6 at 12.
 See Posner, supra note 2 at 3. 32
 For example, the Journal of Economics Literature formally recognized law and economics as a 33
separate field within economics. See Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 3. Moreover, law and 
economics has been institutionalized within law schools rather than economics departments. See 
ibid at 5.
14
through a rational choice model”.  Rationality is the “organising principle”  of 34 35
economics and the “fundamental assumption on which the theory is built”.  Law and 36
economics could not exist as a theory without the assumption of rationality.  Moreover, 37
law and economics’ emphasis on rationality is one of its distinguishing features as it 
places significantly greater weight on the view that people are rational actors than other 
legal theories.38
Yet, despite its utmost significance, rational choice theory is seldom well defined 
within law and economics literature. Instead, scholars rely on an implicit understanding 
of rationality so that “there is rarely a discussion in the legal literature about what, 
exactly, constitutes rational behavior”.  Consequently, most current explanatory 39
approaches to rational choice theory are brief and largely assumed. Most texts provide a 
one-sentence definition of rationality without much elaboration on the specific sub-
components of this definition. They largely treat this definition as self-evident and 
proceed from this assumption. In part, this terse approach may reflect how most 
 Mackaay, supra note 26 at 68.34
 Devlin, supra note 6 at 13. 35
 Friedman, supra note 3 at 17. See also Parisi, supra note 23 at 263 (“[t]his rationality 36
assumption provides the basic foundation for much law and economics literature”).
 Herbert Hovenkamp, “Rationality in Law and Economics” (1992) 60 Geo Wash L Rev 293 at 37
293. See similarly Russell B Korobkin & Thomas S Ulen, “Law and Behavorial Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics” (2000) 88:4 Cal L Rev 1051 at 
1060 and Thomas S Ulen, “0710 Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics” in Gerrit de 
Geet, ed, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd ed (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishers, 2000) at 791(both asserting that rational choice theory lies at the heart of modern 
economics). 
 Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Cambridge: Belknap Press of 38
Harvard University Press, 2004) at 4.
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1060.39
15
economists consider their definition of rational choice “to be so obvious that they never 
doubt it and are puzzled by those who do”.  Although some texts offer a more detailed 40
explanation of rational choice theory, they typically do so in a piecemeal fashion in which 
it is defined at various points throughout papers under different sub-headings rather than 
being integrated in one coherent section.  Neither approach is satisfactory given the 41
central importance of rationality within law and economics. Since rationality is the 
lynchpin of law and economics, it is absolutely critical to understand the meaning of 
rational choice theory in order to grasp the field as a whole. Otherwise, if readers reject 
the rationality assumption presupposed by law and economics, they will, by extension, 
reject every other claim within the theory.
To understand what rationality is within law and economics, it is helpful to first 
consider what it is not. Rationality has a very precise and specific meaning within 
economics which differs from more colloquial and informal meanings. For example, 
many people use the terms “rational” and “irrational” in a moralistic sense to signify their 
respective approval or disapproval of others’ behaviour. Thus, a person may be labelled 
as “irrational” merely because someone disagrees with his or her decision.  On the 42
contrary, law and economics is unapologetically agnostic on questions of morality. 
Whether a person’s action could be considered moral or immoral has no bearing 
 Ulen, supra note 37 at 792.40
 See generally e.g. Devlin, supra note 6 for a scattered approach to discussing rationality across 41
numerous subsections.
 See similarly Daniel M Hausman & Michael S McPherson, Economic Analysis, Moral 42
Philosophy and Public Policy, 2nd ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 50.
16
whatsoever on whether that person is rational. Law and economics accepts that both 
moral and immoral people are rational.  43
Similarly, rationality is also commonly defined as deliberate and consistent 
choice. Under this view, “the decision maker has thought about what he or she will do 
and can give a reasoned justification for the choice”.  Likewise, this definition expects 44
that these reasoned choices will be stable over time so that there are no wild swings in 
behaviour.  By contrast, rationality under law and economics need not be deliberate or 45
even conscious.  There is no requirement that decision makers reflect and reason 46
carefully in order to be considered rational. The theory does not claim that people 
explicitly and consciously weigh costs and benefits in order to calculate expected utility 
when making decisions. Rather, it asserts that people behave “as if” they were making 
these calculations when arriving at their choices.  In this sense, rational self-47
maximization is a largely an evolutionary subconscious process innate to all humans as a 
part of ordinary life. Likewise, although there is some restriction that decisions be stable 
across time, due to the conditions of transitivity and reflexivity, law and economics 
accepts that there may be wild swings in behaviour as evidenced by the sunk cost 
 See Hausmann & McPherson, supra note 42 at 64 noting that “[o]ne can be a rational villain”. 43
See also Friedman, supra note 3 at 8 (discussing a rational burglar). 
 Ulen, supra note 37 at 791.44
 Ibid. 45
 These claims will be further developed when discussing positive law and economics.46
 Posner, supra note 2 at 3-4 and Friedman, supra note 3 at 8 (“Rationality does not mean that a 47
burglar complies an elaborate spreadsheet of costs and benefits before deciding whether to rob 
your house. An armed robber does not work out a precise analysis of how shooting his victim will 
affect the odds of being caught, whether it will reduce the chances by 10 percent or by 20. But if 
it is clear that it will reduce the risk of being caught without increasing the punishment, he is 
quite likely to pull the trigger”).
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fallacy.  Neither of these common definitions of rationality accurately reflects the 48
meaning of rationality within law and economics.
Rationality, under law and economics, means that people are forward-looking so 
that they make decisions anticipating the future with a view to maximizing their self-
interest or expected utility subject to constraints.  Since this definition is complex, 49
consisting of many sub-components, it is helpful to adopt a conceptual framework in 
order to contextualize these multiple aspects. Admittedly there is no universally accepted 
definition of rational choice theory.  However, Korobkin and Ulen argue that rationality 50
in law and economics exists along a “continuum” depending upon “how specific and 
precise the predictions of the theory are”.  They suggest that rationality ranges from 51
“thin” versions which are relatively undemanding to “thick” versions which offer more 
vigorous predictions.  This paper will elaborate on the thinner expected utility version 52
which is a precursor to the thick self-interest version, otherwise known as the dominant 
theory of rationality within law and economics. 
2.3. Rationality as Expected Utility 
Expected utility theory is the most popular theory within microeconomics,  and 53
accordingly the foundational theory of rationality within law and economics.  It is a 
 The conditions of transitivity and reflexivity and the sunk cost fallacy are discussed shortly in 48
this section.
 Shavell, supra note 38 at 1, Miceli, supra note 13 at 1 and Posner, supra note 2 at 9 and 3.49
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1060.50
 Ibid. 51
 Ibid at 1060-61.52
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1062.53
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behavorial theory designed to understand and predict how individuals make decisions.  54
Expected utility holds that people perform an explicit or implicit cost-benefit analysis to 
maximize their expected benefits and minimize their expected costs given their external 
constraints.  Although the term “utility” is used, expected utility theory is not to be 55
mistaken as utilitarianism.  While early economic thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and 56
Adam Smith may be considered precursors of law and economics scholars, these theories 
are separate.57
Expected utility theory is a thin theory of rationality because it does not specify a 
person’s goals or preferences.  Instead, the theory “says nothing about what people 58
want”.  It  leaves open that an individual’s utility function could be conceivably almost 59
anything. Consequently, “utility” is defined quite broadly to include anything that 
contributes to an individual’s satisfaction or happiness such as aesthetic tastes, altruism 
and a desire for fairness.  It is for this reason that expected utility theory does not imply 60
self-interest. Both a person who greatly valued the well-being of others and a person who 
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1062 and Ulen & Cooter, supra note 1 at 12.54
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1063.55
 Many earlier critics dismissed law and economics as applied utilitarianism. See Richard A 56
Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory” (1979) 8:1 J Legal Stud 103 at 103. In 
time, this problem was exacerbated by a tendency in economics literature to use the words 
“utility” and “welfare” as synonyms. See ibid at 104-05. However, the two theories are distinct 
and not equivalent.
 Mackaay, supra note 26 at 67-68, Keith N Hylton, “Calabresi and the Intellectual History of 57
Law and Economics” (2005) 64 Md L Rev 85 at 86 and 90-1 and Parisi, supra note 23 at 260.
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1062.58
Hausmann & McPherson, supra note 42 at 49 (emphasis in original).59
 Shavell, supra note 38 at 2.60
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did not care for others’ well-being are utility maximizers.  Expected utility theory treats 61
individuals’ preferences determining their utility function as exogenous meaning that they 
are derived from outside economics and institutions  and hence outside utility 62
maximization.  A person’s preferences are taken as a given. 63
Although expected utility theory says nothing about why people want what they 
want, it does explain how people act based on what they want. In other words, it explains 
how people choose to best satisfy their goals and preferences without explaining what led 
them to have these goals and preferences in the first place.  Expected utility theory 64
maintains that 
decision makers conduct an explicit or implicit cost-benefit analysis of competing 
options and select the optimal method of achieving their goals (that is, the method 
that maximizes expected benefits and minimizes expected costs, or maximizes net 
benefits), subject to external constraints.65
Constraints refers to the real world limitations people face when making decisions such 
as limited income, time, memory, calculating abilities or limited opportunities.  66
Therefore, people seek the greatest benefit for the least cost.
2.4. Decisions Under Risk and Uncertainty 
 Hausmann & McPherson, supra note 42 at 49.61
 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 1 at 19.62
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1062.63
 Ibid at 1062.64
 Ibid at 1063.65
 Gary S Becker, “Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behaviour” (1993) 101:3 66
Journal of Political Economy 385 at 386.
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Building upon the core concept of utility maximization, law and economics 
acknowledges the practical reality that an individual’s rational self-maximization is 
subject to risk and uncertainty. As there are no guarantees in life, most decisions are made 
in the face of either of risk or uncertainty. Economics draws a distinction between these 
two terms by maintaining that risk is calculable whereas uncertainty is not.  Accordingly, 67
economics provides a series of tools for understanding this real world problem. Thus, the 
term expected utility is used to signify the outcome an individual anticipates will happen. 
Expected utility theory explains that an individual may be either risk-seeking, 
risk-averse or risk-neutral. An individual’s appetite for risk affects his or her utility 
maximization. A risk-seeking individual prefers riskier decisions, so that he or she would 
prefer a smaller chance of a greater gain than a greater chance of a smaller gain. On the 
contrary, a risk-adverse person prefers the opposite or “the safe bet” or “sure thing”. A 
risk-neutral individual would be indifferent between the two. For example, given the 
choice between a 10% chance of winning $1000 and a 100% chance of winning $100, a 
risk-seeking individual would prefer the former, a risk-adverse individual the latter and a 
risk-neutral individual would be indifferent.  Note that mathematically these two 68
outcomes have the same expected value. It is an individual’s attitude toward risk that 
shapes their desirability.
 Uncertainty, like risk, acknowledges that many outcomes cannot be known in 
advance. However, unlike risk, uncertainty is neither probabilistic nor calculable which 
derails self-maximization calculations because an individual cannot properly weigh 
 Posner, supra note 2 at 4-5 explaining the distinction between risk and uncertainty under 67
economics.
 Devlin, supra note 6 at 33-34.68
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benefits and costs.  Consequently, economics must explain how individuals make 69
decisions involving uncertainty. Expected utility theory states that individuals implicitly 
weigh the probability of uncertain outcomes. Thus, people often estimate the likelihood 
of different outcomes even when they cannot be precisely measured.  These estimates 70
allow people to implicitly assign weight to various outcomes so that they can engage in a 
cost-benefit analysis. Admittedly, this approach may raise complexities such as if the 
estimates are arbitrary or inaccurate. However economics recognizes that people still act 
rationally in the face of uncertainty because they taking their best bet despite not having 
full information.  71
2.5. Rationality as Self-Interest 
The self-interest version of rational choice theory is the dominant approach within law 
and economics.   Building upon expected utility theory, the self-interest theory of 72
rationality likewise holds that individuals are rational self-maximizers. The difference 
between the two is whereas the former is indifferent to what individuals prefer, the latter 
assumes that people act to maximize their self-interest. Thus, the self-interest version has 
been referred to as a thick version of rationality because it not only specifies how people 
make decisions but also what their end goal or preferences are.  In turn, this self-interest 73
assumption allows the theory to predict individuals’ behavior. For example, it is 
 Posner insists that uncertainty cannot be calculated although he does not explain why. See 69
Posner, supra note 2 at 4-5.
 For example, although the likelihood of divorce at the time of marriage is usually uncertain, 70
people still rely on a rough estimate of whether divorce will occur. See Devlin, supra note 6 at 39.
 Ibid at 39-40.71
 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1065.72
 Ibid at 1064.73
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commonly predicted in law and economics literature that a cap on or abolition of punitive 
damages would lead to greater numbers of defective products. Although scholars making 
this prediction do not say so, they are implicitly relying on the assumption that product 
manufacturers are self-interested because they only care about their profit and will only 
regard customer health and safety if that somehow affects their end product.  74
Admittedly, the self-interest theory of rationality is somewhat unstable as there is 
no consensus on its meaning within law and economics. There has been some suggestion 
that self-interest should be defined quite narrowly so that a person only cares about the 
effect of consequences on himself or herself. This view of self-interest holds that an 
individual is only concerned for his or her own financial gain and well-being.  However, 75
most prominent law and economics scholars adopt a broader definition, namely that self-
interest means anything that may contribute to an individual’s satisfaction or “ends in 
life”.  Moreover, they explicitly state that self-interest is not to be mistaken for 76
selfishness as it can include consideration for others.  Thus, self-interest is compatible 77
with and may include altruism.  However, some have suggested that the broader 78
definition may lead to unworkable predictions.  79
This paper argues that the narrow versus broad self-interest debate is a false 
dichotomy. In other words, both definitions are compelling because both contain some 
 Ibid at 1065.74
 Kornhauser, supra note 23.75
 Posner, supra note 2 at 3.76
 Posner, supra note 2 at 4.77
 Jeffery L Harrison, Law and Economics in a Nutshell, 4th ed (St Paul, Minnesota: Thomson/78
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truth. Rather than taking an either/or approach in which only one definition may prevail, 
this paper maintains that both definitions are partly correct because some people are 
narrowly self-interested whereas others are broadly self-interested. However, ascertaining 
whether the majority of people are narrowly or broadly self-interested is an empirical 
question well beyond the scope of this paper. 
3.1. Economics as the Allocation of Scarce Resources 
In turn, this rational choice model of human behavior is extended to the principal area of 
study within economics: the allocation of scarce resources through the market. 
Admittedly, how the economic problem of the allocation of scarce resources relates to 
law may be somewhat obscured in existing explanatory texts for three reasons. First, as 
discussed previously, rationality is largely assumed within the literature. Although 
rational choice theory explains why and how market actors, including individuals and 
firms, seek to rationally self-maximize, this point is often implicit and taken as self-
evident. The end result is that discussions regarding the market may inadvertently seem 
disconnected from rational choice theory even though the former implicitly relies on the 
latter. Second, existing texts are not uniform in their explanations of the market as they 
start from different premises depending on the scholar. This varying approach makes 
explanatory accounts seem somewhat inconsistent across texts. In particular, some texts 
open their summaries of microeconomics by taking the existence of markets as a given 
without explaining why they exist in the first place.  Others try to answer this question 80
more definitively. Third, as alluded to earlier, stylistically these texts tend to not explicitly 
demonstrate how the economic idea of the market relates to law. Rather, the tendency is 
 E.g. Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 20-25.80
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to simply provide a summary of microeconomics largely separate from law. Although this 
paper will adopt a similar approach in that it will first outline the standard orthodox view 
of markets under economics before discussing its legal application,  this paper hopes to 
bridge the connection between economics and law.  Therefore, it will begin by explaining 
economics and then outline how these economic concepts impact the analysis of law. 
Again, it is essential to provide an overview of the market solution to the problem of 
allocation of scarce resources because this is the guiding framework for law under law 
and economics.  
3.2. Scarcity 
Economics begins with the observation that human beings live in a world of scarcity in 
which there may be fewer resources available than people who desire them. Scarcity does 
not mean that resources are physically scarce but rather that the supply of a desired good 
is limited compared to the demand for it. For example, although E coli is physically 
scarce, as there is only a finite amount of E coli in the world, it is not economically scarce 
because people do not want this potentially fatal bacterium.  Scarcity leads to conflicts 81
because there is a shortage of desired goods relative to people who want them. For 
example, if there were only two people and only one apple in the world, which they were 
unwilling to divide or share, they would be in conflict. In the language of economics, the 
apple is a scarce resource because its demand exceeds its supply as two people desire or 
demand the apple but there is a supply of only one available. Further assume that both 
people desire the apple because they want to eat it. If one person eats the apple then the 
other cannot and vice versa. Therefore, the apple has alternative or competing uses since 
 Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 3.81
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the one use excludes the other. Scarcity then creates real world problems of justly 
allocating resources.  The dilemma of who gets what is a very tangible and ongoing 82
process. 
3.3.The Market and Perfect Competition 
Economics studies the process by which market forces allocate scarce resources by self-
interested firms producing or supplying goods to meet consumer demand who are 
likewise acting in their own self-interest. Thus, developed countries allocate scarce 
resources through market economies through property rights as the market solution is to 
equate willingness and ability to pay with preferences which in turn serves as a rough 
proxy for utility.83
The economy is understood through the intellectual construct known as perfect 
competition. This theoretical market, being both purely competitive and functioning, 
assumes:
(i) a large number of buyers motivated by self-interest and making the choices 
they expect will maximize their utility; (ii) many sellers, also motivated 
by self-interest, and acting to maximize their profits; (iii) individual 
buyers and sellers are unable to exert any control over the prices and 
are thus price takers; (iv) prices serve as guideposts for decision-
makers in the market to (among other things) communicate scarcity; (v) 
products are standardized (i.e., homogenous); (vi) there are no barriers to entry or exit, 
which means that consumers and producers are free to enter or leave all product 
and factor markets; (vii) all buyers and sellers are fully informed as to 
the terms of all market transactions; (viii) resources are held in 
private property with all rights defined and assigned; and (ix) prevailing 
laws and property rights are fully enforced through the state.84
 Presumably, it is preferable to not allocate resources through dictatorship or arbitrary means 82
based on a desire for fairness. Though both are conceptually possible and unfortunately 
sometimes acted upon.
 Devlin, supra note 6 at 12.83
 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 20.84
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Perfect competition takes the expected utility and self-interested theory of rational choice 
as the norm for firm and consumer behavior. It then adds to this theory a variety of 
assumptions such as that all transactions are made freely and with full consent and 
information. Importantly, perfect competition is an idealized construct meant to provide a 
useful model for economists to make workable predictions about the economy. It is not 
meant to provide an accurate depiction of the world as these conditions will rarely be met 
in practice. Perfect competition explains how producers utilize privately owned scarce 
resources to produce goods and services which meet the demands of consumers.  85
  The market necessitates that individuals make choices about what they desire 
most and how much they are willing to pay to acquire it. Since people have restricted 
time and income, they cannot chose to buy everything or have every experience that they 
would like to have  and accordingly must prioritize what they want most. Hence, the 86
“economic problem is the necessity of choice under scarcity”.  Microeconomics offers a 87
theory, self-interested rationality, to explain how people make these decisions.  In 88
economic terms, individuals choose the optimal bundle of goods and services that best 
satisfies their preferences given their constraints.  Individuals aim to self maximize 89
because rationality requires it.  Hence, decisions are made at the margins in which 90
people consider the benefit and cost of the next unit of any given good. Thus, people will 
 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 20-21.85
 Cooter & Ulen, supra note 1 at 12. 86
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only purchase or sell one unit more if the benefit that they would receive would be larger 
than the cost of purchasing or producing that unit.91
In practice, choices are costly because they require trade-offs in which any choice 
includes not only its explicit monetary price but also its opportunity cost which is the cost 
of foregoing alternatives.  For example, if a person paid $25 to eat a pizza at a restaurant 92
then he or she would not only incur the monetary cost but also the opportunity cost of not 
ordering steak instead. Hence, economists often remark “there is no such thing as a free 
lunch”. Similarly, people face information costs also known as or the costly of acquiring 
and comprehending information when making choices. 
4.1. Incorporating Rationality and the Market: Old versus 
New Law and Economics 
These insights from economics that humans conform to a rational choice model and that 
the market allocates scarce resources were initially modestly incorporated into law under 
what has been dubbed “old law and economics”.  Following the leadership of University 93
of Chicago law professor Aaron Director, who pioneered much of the economic analysis 
of antitrust law, early law and economics was almost entirely focused on competition 
matters. Although other areas of law were examined through an economic lens, such as 
corporate law, tax law and patent law, the old school was restricted to explicit markets 
 Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 5.91
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and obvious “economic areas”.  In this sense, the economic analysis of law was initially 94
quite modest as it was limited to few areas. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, law and economics crystallized into its modern form 
under the “new school” as revolutionary papers by Ronald Coase, Henry Manne, Guido 
Calabresi and Gary Becker expanded the economic analysis into core common law areas 
such as tort and contract.  These scholars understood economics as applicable to legal 95
rules in areas traditionally not considered to be relevant for market behaviour, thus 
paving the way for economic analysis in virtually every aspect of law. Although these 
seminal pieces of scholarship were foundational for law and economics, they were 
somehow disjointed being focused on discrete areas of private and public law. It was not 
until a decade later when Richard Posner made the first attempt to demonstrate law and 
economics as an all encompassing theory throughout the entire common law in his 
landmark Economic Analysis of Law.  He largely repeated and summarized the findings 96
of these earlier scholars in order to demonstrate the implicit underlying economic logic in 
all of law. Accordingly, although Posner did not originate all the ideas, in many respects 
he perfected them, earning him the role of mainstream law and economics’ central 
figure.  Thus new law and economics holds that  97
 the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human 
behavior, be it behavior involving money prices or imputed shadow 
 Posner, supra note 2 at 29 and Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 95-100.94
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prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, large or minor decisions, 
emotional or mechanical ends.98
Under the new school of law and economics individuals are rational self-maximizers in 
all areas of their life, no matter what the decision or context.  This allows modern law 99
and economics its unwavering insistence that economics is applicable to all areas of law 
rather than simply its obvious market areas such as competition and taxation, because 
much of law deals with non market behaviour such as divorce and accidents.  100
4.2. The Problem of Social Cost 
The shift from old to new law and economics began with Ronald Coase. “The Problem of 
Social Cost”  is one of the most widely cited and discussed articles in legal academia. It 101
is the most cited article within law and economics  and “the most famous example of 102
the economic analysis of law”.  Yet despite its position as the foundational article of 103
modern law and economics, tying rational choice theory and microeconomics to private 
law, it is commonly misunderstood and inaccurately summarized.  In part, this approach 104
stems from George Stiglier’s somewhat ungenerous view of Coase’s article, coining the 
term “Coase Theorem” and influencing subsequent scholarship.  Consequently, much of 105
 Becker, supra note 66 at 8.98
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the current understanding of “The Problem of Social Cost” has been simplistically 
collapsed into  the statement that absent transaction costs parties will negotiate to the 
efficient outcome. While Coase’s article stands for this proposition, this is an overly 
narrow summary of his work divorced from its original context and purpose. More 
importantly, it fails to explain the utter centrality of “The Problem of Social Cost” within 
law and economics as necessary to unpacking the theory’s central claims because the 
Coase Theorem is a step to positive and normative law and economics. 
Although “The Problem of Social Cost” has broad implications for the entirety of 
law and economics, Coase wrote his article as a relatively focused and narrow response 
to the prevailing view of the day, popularized by economist Pigou, that government 
intervention was needed to correct market externalities. In the standard example of 
externalities, a factory produces harmful smoke as part of its production process which in 
turn pollutes a nearby residential area.  Since preventing the pollution would create 106
additional production costs for the factory,  it has no incentive to stop polluting. It 107
would be cheaper for the factory to pollute because that minimizes its costs. 
Consequently, the residents suffer the negative externality of pollution. In this instance, 
the private costs borne by the factory, namely the costs of its production process, diverge 
from the social costs, the costs of pollution on the residents. Thus, there is a negative 
externality, a form of market failure in which the actor does not experience the full costs 
 See Coase, supra note 101 at 837. Readers wishing for a more thorough discussion of the 106
standard example are directed to Friedman, supra note 3 at 36-38.
 For example, by installing some devices to control or maintain the pollution. 107
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of his or her behavior, in this case the pollution, because the cost is borne by another 
party.108
At the time of Coase’s response, the then current understanding of negative 
externalities dictated three possible responses of state intervention to correct this market 
failure.  First, a Pigouvian tax could be levelled against the business for the amount of 109
pollution. This tax should be priced at the same amount as the pollution thereby forcing 
the factory to internalize the costs of its production, correcting the negative externality. 
Second, the factory could be liable for the damages it caused, triggering the same process 
of internalizing the externality. Third, most invasively, the factory could be excluded 
from residential districts. In any event, Coase challenged all three options maintaining 
they were “inappropriate in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even 
usually, desirable”.110
Coase flipped the prevailing understanding of externalities on its head, exposing 
the myth of  presupposed mandatory state intervention. He began by carefully observing 
that contrary to the popular notion of externalities, which saw harm as a one-way 
monocausal relationship, this view mistakenly ignored the inherent reciprocal nature 
between the parties. It is not the case that the business in question is always the harm 
causer bearing full responsibility for the negative externality. Rather, Coase asserted, both 
parties negatively injure each other because externalities cannot exist without the 
presence of another. For example, if the factory had been polluting in an industrial area 
 Devlin, supra note 6 at 30. 108
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with no neighbouring homes then there would not be a negative externality. It is only 
because some people chose to live next to the factory that harm occurred. Both parties are 
harmed by each other’s presence because they have competing uses of the same space. 
Given then that externalities rely on an inherently reciprocal nature, the question is not 
which form of state intervention should be used to punish the business but rather which 
party should be allowed to inflict harm on the other.  111
Coase illustrated the reciprocal nature of harm by using the economics model of 
perfect competition to demonstrate that parties can resolve tort disputes by negotiating to 
the efficient outcome, thereby eliminating any need for government intervention, through 
his now famous Coase Theorem hypothetical. Although the facts can be and have been 
explored in a variety of contexts,  in his original hypothetical Coase imagined a conflict 112
involving a rancher whose cows wander into a neighbouring farmer’s land, destroying 
some of the latter’s crop.  He argued that absent transaction costs, the farmer and 113
rancher would negotiate to the efficient outcome regardless of who held the initial 
property right. Therefore, regardless if the farmer had a legal right to not have the cows 
on his or her land or if the rancher had a legal right to allow his or her cattle to roam, 
either way the parties would negotiate to the exact same social outcome in a world of 
zero transaction costs. 
 Coase then demonstrated the theorem through a series of older common law tort 
cases where he showed that they all conformed to the same efficiency based logic. He 
 Coase, supra note 101 at 837-38.111
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argued these judges were implicitly drawing upon economic principles in their decisions. 
He maintained that although these judges did not invoke economic language, there 
nonetheless was “some recognition, perhaps largely unconscious and certainly not very 
explicit, of the economic aspects of the questions at issue”.  Therefore, under Coase’s 114
view, economic reasoning in judicial decisions was largely intuitive and inherent. 
Posner expanded upon Coase’s foundational work by moving from the very 
specific tort examples outlined in “The Problem of Social Costs” into all areas of law 
generally. Not only would law generate efficient outcomes in the relatively contained 
examples discussed by Coase, but this efficiency hypothesis would explain the 
significantly broader entire body of common law doctrine. Thus, Posner maintained that 
transaction costs underlined both the positive and normative branches of law and 
economics, as existing legal doctrine is understood as the common law’s effort to reduce 
transaction costs and that normatively the best legal decisions reduction transactions 
costs.115
4.3. The Market Applied to Law: Law As Prices and Law As 
Entitlements 
Drawing largely from the work of Coase and Posner, the crucial innovation of law and 
economics was to take the market, a theoretical construct designed to explain the flow of 
scarce resources from rational profit maximizing firms to rational utility maximizing 
consumers, as a framework for understanding legal decisions from both the perspective 
of lawmakers and law abiders or breakers. No longer were markets limited to explicit 
 Ibid at 856.114
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markets such as the stock trade, as now any legal decision can be analyzed under the 
“legal market”. Economics can explain the behaviour of those those who enforce the law 
and those who obey or violate the law. Consequently, two approaches emerged the 
entitlement approach focused on lawmakers and the legal system which analogizes legal 
rules are setting the entitlements for scarce resources and the price theory approach which 
analogizes laws as setting prices for behavior implicitly shaping people’s decisions to 
comply with or violate law. Although both views, co-exist throughout the scholarship, 
unfortunately most explanatory literature tends to be rooted in only one of these two 
approaches. In particular, many texts tend to only focus on the price theory view. 
Unfortunately, this emphasis on price theory creates inconsistency across texts and offers 
a somewhat myopic impression of law and economics. The better approach would be to 
explicitly set out that law and economics contains both a top-down approach focused on 
lawmakers, the entitlement view, and a ground-up approach focused on citizens, the price 
theory view. 
4.4. Legal Rules As Prices  
The rational choice model underscoring economics allows law and economics to 
accurately predict the real world effect of legal rules on people’s behaviour.  This is 116
because under rational choice theory “all relevant assumptions about individuals’ desires, 
their knowledge, their capabilities, and the environment will have been made explicit”.  117
The predictive mode is both empirical and practical, focusing on answering how changes 
 E.g. Shavell, supra note 38 at 1 and Friedman, supra note 3 at 9. This predictive mode is 116
sometimes referred to as “descriptive law and economics”: see e.g. Shavell, supra note 38 at 1. 
Since this term may be confused for the descriptive function of law and economics, the paper will 
instead use the term “predictive law and economics” to eliminate any ambiguous terminology. 
 Shavell, supra note 38 at 1-2.117
35
in law will alter behaviour. It aims to determine what effect a law will have by setting out 
a hypothesis to be tested against actual real world conditions.  Thus, the price theory style 
of law and economics has a nearly endless array of questions to investigate such as 
whether increasing the length of imprisonment for murder will increase or decrease the 
murder rate or if punitive damages for products liability will encourage manufacturers to 
take greater care.  In this sense, this branch of law and economics is externally focused, 118
concerned with how citizens interact with law and the legal system.
Closely tied to the predictive view lies the strong emphasis on ex ante, as opposed 
to ex post, reasoning within law and economics. Unlike the majority of legal theories 
which concentrate on ex post reasoning, accepting that the relevant harm occurred and 
accordingly only aiming to apportion the responsibility and cost of that harm, law and 
economics has broader goals. It seeks not only to address the parties in the particular case 
before it, but also to create incentives for similarly situated parties in the future.  Thus, 119
“[l]egal rules are to be judged by the structure of incentives they establish and the 
consequences of people altering their behaviour in response to those incentives”.  Law 120
and economics has the benefit of maintaining the traditional goal of apportioning costs 
within any given legal case as well as positively impacting potential future cases.
 The predictive view frames itself as value neutral, ostensibly illuminating the 
consequences of legal rules without guiding which legal rule is best. For instance, 
although law and economics can predict whether an increase in the penalty for speeding 
 See e.g. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 1 at 3, Miceli, supra note 13 at 4 and Mercuro & Medema, 118
supra note 4 at 43.
 Posner, supra note 2 at 32-33 and Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 43. 119
 Friedman, supra note 3 at 11 (emphasis removed).120
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will lead to a decrease in this behaviour, it cannot dictate whether this is a sensible 
change. However laudable the goal of a value neutral theory may be, critics argue that 
applying economics to law “shapes thought and language by determining what we look at 
and what we see”.  Their argument is that law and economics, by highlighting attention 121
to efficiency concerns, determines the scope of debate for legal change and subsequently 
implicitly informs the choice of legal rule. On the contrary, law and economics scholars 
assert that mere prediction of what effect a particular legal rule will have does not denote 
any particular conclusion.  Regardless of how neutral the predictive mode is in practice, 122
nearly everyone agrees that analyzing what effects law will have is valuable especially as 
it may ultimately help determine which rule is preferable.123
Moreover, law and economics expands upon this function to argue that law and 
economics predicts the real world effect of legal rules which, by extension, may shape 
behaviour in a socially desirable direction.  
4.5. Legal Rules As Entitlements 
Utilizing economics, the study of the allocation of scarce resources, law and economics 
conceives of law as a battleground for allocation. Under a legal framework, the allocation 
of scarce resources refers not to the physical resource itself but rather the right or 
entitlement to that scarce resource.  This may be thought of as the “right to perform 124
certain actions”.   Since in most situations transaction costs are prohibitively high, such 125
 Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 44.121
 Ulen & Cooter, supra note 1 at 4.122
 Friedman, supra note 3 at 15.123
 Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 6.124
 Ibid citing Coase.125
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that parties will not be able to negotiate to the efficient outcome, there must be an 
objective criteria that will allow lawmakers to assign entitlements. Thus, the law should 
allocate scarce resources by “mimicking the market” so that entitlements are assigned to 
the most efficient user, replicating what would have happened in a perfectly functioning 
market.  In practice, courts are expected to either lower transaction costs facilitating 126
competitive markets and allowing for mutually beneficial exchanges or, if transaction 
costs are prohibitively high, price transactions at the rate that they would have been if the 
parties had been able to bargain. Law and economics justifies this approach through its 
use of the market as a guiding analogy for legal decisions. 
5.1. The Benchmark for Law and Economics: Efficiency 
Under economics, efficiency is the standard used to assess how well the market is 
functioning. It is used to judge the total costs and benefits stemming from the allocation 
of entitlements to scarce resources based on individual preferences. Efficiency therefore 
is the “proxy for social welfare; the more efficient a given allocation, the greater welfare 
benefits for society”.  In turn, efficiency is also the normative hallmark for the 127
evaluation of legal rules under law and economics. Put simply, a legal rule or decision is 
good if it increases efficiency and bad if it does not.
Unfortunately, efficiency is often defined and weighed differently as well as is 
misunderstood in the scholarship.  Although different versions of efficiency co-exist 128
within law and economics, at its heart efficiency reflects the extent to which law 
 See also Coleman, supra note 11 at 658.126
 Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 12. 127
 Jules L Coleman, “Efficiency, Auction and Exchange: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic 128
Approach to Law” (1980) 68:2 Cal L Rev 221 at 222.
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facilitates people’s ability to satisfy their preferences; the more efficient an outcome is, 
the better it satisfies these preferences. Typically, both economics and law and economics 
begin with the concept of Pareto efficiency or a Pareto improvement in which at least one 
person is made better off and no one else is made worse off as the result of a voluntary 
transaction.  Since neoclassical economics judges efficiency by the extent to which 129
people’s preferences are satisfied, individuals are made “better off” under Pareto 
efficiency because they judge their own preferences to be more fulfilled.  Exchanges 130
under Pareto efficiency affect the allocation of scarce resources by placing them in the 
hands of those who desire them most. Consequently, Pareto efficiency is a measure of 
allocative efficiency which refers to “the distribution of goods and services in the 
economy to maximize social welfare”.  It is an attractive standard, being strongly 131
grounded in consent as only voluntary exchanges are possible and any exchange which 
will make at least one person worse off is prevented.132
Despite its appeal, in reality few transactions will ever be Pareto efficient as, by 
definition, it only applies to contracts without negative externalities.  Consequently, it is 133
extremely difficult if not impossible to adopt Pareto criteria as a legal standard as the 
majority of legal rules produce losers. In other words, it is impossible to interpret a legal 
rule without making at least one party worse off.  Consequently, Pareto efficiency exists 134
 Devlin, supra note 6  at 32. 129
 Ibid.130
 Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 13.131
 See generally Devlin, supra note 6 and Miceli, supra note 13.132
 Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 14. 133
 See generally Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4.134
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more as an ideal rather than a practical measure. Moreover, even if possible, it suffers 
from two principal theoretical limitations. First, since it takes initial distributions as a 
given and only judges whether subsequent exchanges are efficient,  Pareto efficiency 135
does nothing to correct situations where an initial distribution of goods and services is 
unjust. Second, similarly, it does not lead to a unique allocation but rather a multitude of 
different allocations. Since there are many possible allocations, these are non comparable 
because  they all make at least one person better off. Consequently, a main criticism of 
efficiency based standards is that there is no way of ranking them.136
The difficulty in actualizing Pareto efficiency has led to the much more 
controversial Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or wealth maximization as the efficiency norm in 
law and economics. Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a legal decision is considered 
efficient provided that the winners could theoretically compensate the losers and still 
experience a net gain. However, actual compensation need not take place.137
5.2. A Positive and Normative Theory 
Law and economics is both a positive and a normative theory of law. Positive law and 
economics is internally focused and descriptive, being concerned with the internal 
consistency of legal rules.  Positive law and economics asserts that law, particularly 138
 Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 14.135
 Miceli, supra note 13 at 4-5. For example, if A valued a good at $1 and B valued the same 136
good at $100, then any exchange between $1 and $100 would be efficient.
 It is for this reason that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is sometimes referred to as Pareto potential 137
efficiency to reflect that the fact that compensation need not actually occur.
 The Chicago school is sometimes referred to as “the positive school” in contrast to the 138
“normative school” of Yale law and economics in scholarship. See e.g Parisi, supra note 23 at 
264. However, to avoid confusion the paper will only use the terms positive and normative to 
refer to the underlying claims within the Chicago school rather than to denote different schools.
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common law doctrine, has been developed in accordance with the principle of efficiency 
such that existing legal rules are wealth maximizing.  This claim, known as the 139
“efficiency of the common law hypothesis”,  is most closely associated with Posner 140
whose thesis held that common law doctrine developed according to an underlying 
economic efficiency in order to avoid waste and maximize societal wealth.  In his 141
landmark Economic Analysis of Law, Posner demonstrates how each common law 
doctrine may be conceptualized as an attempt to lower transaction costs and maximize 
wealth. In turn, this set up a research agenda for scholars to use concepts from 
neoclassical economics to determine which rules are efficient and show that the common 
law did in fact operate according to this principle. Although the efficiency of the 142
common law hypothesis has provoked significant debate and criticism testing its validity, 
this debate is outside the scope of this paper. Consequently, the efficiency of the common 
law hypothesis will be largely assumed notwithstanding literature contesting this claim.
As a continuation of positive law and economics, normative law and economics 
extends and justifies the efficiency of the common law claim as the preferable style of 
legal rules. Not only has law been developed in accordance with wealth maximization, as 
revealed by the descriptive branch, but additionally law should maximize wealth across 
 See Parisi, supra note 23 at 264.139
 Parisi, supra note 23 at 264.140
 This view has also been supported by law and economics scholars who argue that litigation 141
tends toward efficiency. See e.g. Paul H Rubin, “Why Is The Common Law Efficient?” (1977) 6 J 
Legal Stud 51 and William M Landes, “An Economic Analysis of the Court” (1971) 14 J L & 
Econ 61. Similarly, there have been some efforts to expand the efficiency of the common law 
claim across legal systems. See Paul H Rubin, “Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and 
Demand” (2000) 13 Supreme Court Economic Review 19.
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society. Admittedly, wealth maximization as a normative principle, has been extremely 
controversial both within and especially outside law and economics. There is no 
uniformity or consensus between law and economics scholars on whether efficiency 
should be the goal of law and how law should be reformed to best achieve efficiency.  143
Although, wealth maximization has triggered significant hostility outside law and 
economics,  these objections are outside the scope of the paper and it accepts wealth 144
maximization as this is normative law and economics under the mainstream view.
In turn, the positive and normative branches of law and economics center on three 
main areas. As Friedman explains, law and economics is principally concerned with three 
distinct areas of “predicting what effect particular legal rules will have, explaining why 
particular legal rules exist,  [and] deciding what legal rules should exist”.  In other 145
words, law and economics has a descriptive function aimed at understanding why law has 
unfolded in the particular way that it has, a predictive function aimed at identifying what 
effect law will have and a normative function aimed at choosing what the best laws are. It 
seeks to understand why past law has developed, while also looking to see how law 
should be shaped in the future. 
 It is for this reason that “normative law and economics” may also be seen as an invitation to 143
decide what normative basis law should be decided upon. This paper is only using the term 
normative law and economics to denote the mainstream Chicago view. See Hanson, Hanson & 
Hart, supra note 20 at 300 and Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 48-50.
 See notably, the Hofstra Law Review Symposium on Efficiency including Richard A Posner, 144
“The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication” (1980) 
8:3 Hofstra L Rev Article 2, Jules L Coleman, “Efficiency, Utility and Wealth 
Maximization” (1980) 8:3 Hofstra L Rev Article 3 and Ronald Dworkin, “Why Efficiency? A 
Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner” (1980) 8:3 Hofstra L Rev Article 4. This 
symposium led to a small wave of scholarship in the 1980s concerned with the moral basis, or 
lack thereof, of wealth maximization. 
 Friedman, supra note 3 at 15.145
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6.1 Conclusion 
This paper has synthesized the major literature explaining law and economics in the 
hopes of providing a more coherent and complete account of the theory. It has described 
how law and economics rests on a rational choice theory which is the basis for explaining 
the allocation of scarce resources through the market. In turn, the concept of the market is 
analogized to all legal decisions providing an efficiency based view of law. This requires 
lawmakers to either lower transaction costs such that parties can either negotiate to 
efficient outcomes themselves or price transactions in such a way that the parties would 
have if there had been no transaction costs. 
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